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Agriculture and long-run growth 
In 1700, all economies were based very largely on agricultural production. The 
agricultural sector employed most of the workforce, consumed most of the 
capital inputs and provided most of the outputs in the economy. In sorne ways 
this is  obvious. People in 1700  were  much poorer than they are today but 
required similar levels of food intake, so food must have constituted a higher 
percentage of economic activity  - whether mea  su red from  the production, 
consumption, or expenditure side of the national income identity. Hence at 
the onset of  the Industrial Revolution in England ,around 1770, food accounted 
for approximately 60 percent of the household budget, compared with just 10 
percent in 2001 (Feinstein, 1998). But it is important to realise that agriculture 
additionally provided most of  the raw materials for industrial production: fibres 
for cloth, animal skins for leather, and wood for building houses and ships and 
making the charcoal used in metal smelting. There was scarcely an economic 
activity that was not ultimately dependent on agricultural production - even 
down to the quill pens and ink used by clerks in the service industries. 
The very large share of  agriculture in economic activity has several important 
economic  implications.  First,  the  growth  rates  of agricultural  output  and 
productivity within each  country were the primary determinants of overall 
growth rates in each country. Similarly, agricultural productivity differentials 
across countries were the primary determinants of overall productivity differ-
entials across countries. Second, Crafts (1985a) has emphasized that substantial 
food im  ports were unavailable to any country in the eighteenth century beca  use 
no country was producing a sufficient agricultural surplus to be able to supply 
the food demanded by another. Therefore any transfer oflabor resources from 
agriculture to industry required high output per worker in domestic agricul-
ture, beca  use each agricultural worker had to produce enough to feed  both 
himself and sorne fraction of an industrial worker. This is crucial, beca  use the 
transfer of labor resources out of agriculture and into industry has come to be 
seen as the defining feature of early industrialization. Alternative paradigms of 
industrial revolution - such as significant increases in the rate of productivity 
growth, or a marked superiority of industrial productivity over that of agricul-
ture - have not been supported by the empirical evidence. 
Measuring the importance of  the agricultural sector in each economy in 1700 
and tracing its evolution over time with any degree of  precision are impossible. 
The standard modern approach would be to calculate for each year the share of 
agriculture in GDP in each country. By contrast, the best that we can do is to 
estimate the percentage of  the workforce employed in agriculture for a selection 
of countries at benchmark dates. N  onetheless, this proves to be quite a useful 
statistic if  we follow the Crafts definition of  industrialization. Brunt and Fidalgo Agriculture 
Table 6.1  The percentage of the  European workforce  employed  in 
agriculture 
Source: Brunt and Fidalgo, 2008. 
(2008)  recently reexamined the available data on the European agricultural 
workforce and we report their findings in Table 6.1. 
We can see that the relative importance of agriculture declined fastest in 
England, Scotland, and Belgium, with the Netherlands being sorne way behind. 
Norway was  also low,  but this is  almost certainly due to the extraordinary 
importance of  fishing in GDP, rather than a sign of  early industrialization. Most 
other  European  eco  no  mies  remained  predominantly  agricultural  through 
to 1870. 
Measuring agricultural productivity in this period is very difficult owing to 
the severe data constraints. The data on labor and land inputs are poor; but the 
data on capital inputs are non-existent, which precludes any attempt to esti-
mate total factor productivity. The data on arable agriculture are considerably 
better than  the  data  on pastoral agriculture.  This is  partIy beca  use  arable 
agriculture is  immobile and tends to be  taxed, whereas pastoral agriculture 
can be highly mobile and is therefore seldom or ineffectually taxed. But, also, 
there is a clear distinction in arable agriculture between inputs (such as seed 
and fertilizer) and outputs (such as grain and straw). By contrast, in pastoral 
agriculture an animal can be either an input (such as a breeding cow that gives 
milk and calves) or an output (such as a cow that is sent to the slaughter house 
for meat and leather); tax and census data on animals almost never distinguish 
between these different possibilities. Dennison and James  ~irrlR!:lm 
Table 6.2  European agriculturallabor productivity (England = 100 in 1800) 
Source: Derived from Allen, 2000, p. 20. 
An alternative procedure is to derive agricultural output from the demand 
side.  The crudest procedure  is  to  assume  constant consumption per head. 
However, economists have long established that the demand for food varies 
with in  come and relative prices. U  sing abundant historical data on wages and 
prices, together with standard assumptions concerning the price and income 
elasticities of demand, Allen (2000) derives the demand for food for a number 
of European  economies  for  the  period  l300-1800. Making  allowances  for 
known imports and exports of food  then provides estimates of agricultural 
output. Dividing agricultural output by the agriculturallabor force yields the 
results reported in Table 6.2. 
We can  see  that England,  Belgium,  and the  Netherlands were  far  more 
productive than other countries. This fits broadly with the emerging literature 
that stresses the divergence between northwestern Europe and the rest of the 
continent during the early modern periodo This pattern of comparative pro-
ductivity can also be seen in the later nineteenth century, when better quality 
data become available,  based on direct observation of outputs. The data for 
1890 in  Table  6.3  show a very similar pattern of comparative productivity 
within Europe, with output per worker substantially higher in the northwest 
than in the rest of the continent. 
There are a number of well-known and important difficulties in using labor 
productivity as  an indicator. One problem is  that we  are measuring annual 
labor productivity as total output divided by all workers, rather than produc-
tivity  per hour worked,  and  there  could  be  systematic  differences  across 
countries in workforce utilization. For example, agriculturallabor in traditional 
societies  often  had several  sources  of employrnent and these could inelude 
alternative sector  s such as services (especially transport), construction, mining, 
or industry.  AIso,  workers  could be  seasonally unemployed;  their earnings Table 6.3  European agricultural  labor productivity 
in  1890 (United  Kingdom  = 100) 
Source: Q'Brien and Prados de la Escosura, 1992, 
p.531. 
might be enough to keep them living in the countryside year-round but there 
was  not  enough  work  to  keep  them  occupied  in  the  slack  periods.  This 
distinction was perhaps less  important in a country such as  England, where 
in 1700 the agricultural workforce consisted of family labor supplemented by 
young  adults  hired  on annual  contracts  (Allen,  1994,  p.  106).  But  it  was 
important on  the  large  Italian  and Spanish  latifundios,  where  the  highly 
seasonal demand for labor led to temporary contracts and farm employment 
for the landless that was  perhaps half that of those in northern Europe. The 
problem for much of southern and eastern Europe was the lack of year-round 
employment opportunities in agriculture. 
However, if we take the aboye estimates as broadly representative then we 
need to consider just why labor productivity and rural living standards differed 
so markedly across Europe. This requires us to explain both why productivity 
and farmers' living standards failed to rise over much of eastern and southern 
Europe, and why labor productivity surged ahead in sorne areas of northwest 
Europe. Successive sections below look at technological change and population 
growth, urban markets and specialization, and institutional factors. We con-
clude with  sorne  general comments on the contribution of the agricultural 
sector to industrialization. 
Technological change and the growth  01 productivity and population 
The significant increase in Europe's population over the period 1700 to 1870, 
described in Chapter 2 of this volume, required an increase in food output if 
living standards were not to decline. Much of  the European continent had long 
been  settled,  hence changes  in the size  of the population equate largely to 
changes in the density of  population, rather than expansion at the geographical Tracy Dennison and James Simpson 
frontier as in North America or Australia. Much, though not all, ofthe increase 
in output between 1700 and 1870 is attributable to an increase in the intensity 
of  rotations and the switch to new crops. In exceptional cases this could involve 
the planting and production of  a high-value crop, such as grapes in the Médoc, 
but usually it involved much humbler ones such as the potato, which was high 
in calories and low in cost. 
The Ma1thusian  model of population notes that rising population makes 
land  increasingly  (relatively)  scarce. We would  expect  this  to  prompt the 
adoption of land-saving techniques and result in a reduction in output per 
worker,  since  each  worker  has  less  land  to  cultivate.  At  first  glance,  the 
European evidence is  consistent with this interpretation. For example, land 
was  in  limited supply in  the Netherlands.  Therefore,  as  the economy and 
population boomed in the seventeenth century as a result of  the Dutch monop-
oly of the spice trade to Asia, it made sense to respond by both creating new 
land and intensifying production on existing land to meet the urban demand 
for food. This prompted both the reclamation ofland from the sea using dykes, 
and the application of much more fertilizer to each unit ofland. A comparable 
change in England in the eighteenth century was the replacement of  fallow land 
by crops such as  turnips and clover, thus making more intensive use of land 
resources and effectively increasing the area of  cultivated land per worker. This 
technique reached its apogee in England in the mid-nineteenth century with 
the widespread adoption of the "Norfolk four-course" crop rotation, in which 
wheat cultivation in one year was followed by turnips in the next year, barley in 
the next, and clover in the next. This system was  adopted in the nineteenth 
century in modified form in other northern European countries. In the English 
system the turnips and clover were fed to animals, which raised meat output for 
the voracious English market. In France and parts of  central Europe the turnips 
were substituted with sugar beet; this made sense because the farmers faced a 
lower demand for meat (since incomes were lower and meat is  an income-
elastic good) and sugar was more expensive (since countries such as Germany 
did  not  have  tropical  colonies  which  could  produce  cheap  cane  sugar). 
Attempts were made around the Mediterranean to introduce the new rotations 
of  northern Europe, but they usually failed beca use of  the very different farming 
and market conditions found there. 
Yet southern farmers were not necessarily disadvantaged in the same way as 
their northern counterparts when it carne to rising population pressure. One of 
the  problems  of southern  Europe  was  the  periodic  unemployment  that 
occurred through the year,  and intensification of production could help to 
solve this problem. First, in sorne areas the land, which had once provided only 
poor-quality natural grazing, was plowed up and cereals sown instead. Second, 
cereal rotations, which had provided just a single harvest every three or more Agriculture 
years, were shortened so that crops were  taken more frequentiy.  Finally, the 
area under crops such as vines and olives increased. While a hectare of cereals 
in southern Spain in the 1880s provided only about 20 days' employment per 
year (less if fallow is taken into consideration), the vine required 80 days and 
the  olive  30  days  (Simpson,  1995).  Contemporaries  in  Spain  at  this  time 
considered that their natural re so urce endowment was  favorable,  and cereal 
producers in the 1850s and winegrowers in the 1870s looked to become major 
exporters.  Their hopes were  ruined  only  as  the  integration  of global  food 
markets  led  to  New  World  countries  capturing  these  export  markets  and 
then  threatening  Spain's  domestic  markets  themselves.  The  situation  was 
similar elsewhere  in the  Mediterranean. Tariffs were  significantly increased 
on cereals in Spain in 1891, just as theywere in France (1885-94), Italy (1887-94), 
and Portugal (1889-99). Spanish contemporaries carne  to reflect bitterly on 
what were then perceived as their country's poor natural resource endowments. 
In effect, the integration of the North Atlantic grain and livestock economy had 
shifted the comparative advantage of large areas of the Mediterranean from 
land-intensive agriculture to  capital-intensive agriculture. The difficulties for 
farmers to adapt to this change were considerable, and the final  stage in the 
process  of crop  intensification  only  carne  with  modern  irrigation,  which 
required both the construction of large-scale reservoirs to store the water (as 
opposed to simply using free-flowing rivers and streams) and the development 
ofbiotechnologies to create new specialist crops to sell in national and interna-
tional markets. Certainly there were sorne signs of  change in the Mediterranean 
as early as  1870, but the process only acquired any real importance from the 
mid-twentieth century. 
In eastern Europe, too, especially in the areas still dominated by serfdom, the 
introduction  of new  agricultural  technologies  occurred  more  slowly  and 
unevenly than in the northwest. There were  sorne entrepreneurial landlords 
who introduced new rotations and crops on their demesne lands. For example, 
in the mid-eighteenth century the Kleist family initiated a move from the tradi-
tional three-field grain system  to a system  of fallow-free  convertible farming, 
which resulted in a substantial increase in output (Hagen, 2002,  pp.  314-15). 
Further east,  demand grew among more  enterprising Russian landlords for 
English books on agricultural improvements.
1 There were  even instances of 
Russian peasants themselves introducing modifications such as new fertilizers 
andnon-grain crops on their own allotments (Moon, 1999, pp. 130-31). On the 
whole, however, the three-field system of grain cultivation (mainly wheat, rye, 
1  Konslantin Levin. lhe enlhusiaslic  reformer in Tolsloy's Anna Karenina. was modelled on such a landlord. JI  is worth 
noting Ihal in Ihe end Levin abandons his reforms. having decided Ihal English innovalions were impossible in a Russian 
contexto Dennison and James 
and oats)  remained in place throughout eastern Europe until well  into the 
nineteenth century (in  much of Russia  it  remained in  place even  after the 
abolition of serfdom in 1861).  This was  to sorne extent due to  the different 
ecological conditions in this region (shorter growing seasons, different soils) 
and, in the case of  the Russian empire, to an abundance of land, which reduced 
the pressure to intensify production. But even more important in central and 
eastern Europe were  the institutional constraints  imposed by serfdom and 
strong rural communities, about which more will be said la ter. 
One example of  crop intensification which achieved widespread success was 
the introduction of  the potato. Although it had been known since the sixteenth 
century, when it had been brought by the Spanish from its native habitat in the 
Peruvian and Bolivian Andes, the potato was rarely grown in Europe before the 
late eighteenth century. Then a combination of growing population pressure, 
grain  shortages,  and famine,  together  with  the  development  of new  seed 
varieties, encouraged its spread - in the early 1770s to parts of Switzerland, 
Germany, and Austria, in the 1790s to France, and in the 1810s to Hungary and 
Poland (Blum,  1978,  pp.  271-76). While France had about 20,000  hectares 
planted on the eve of  the Revolution, the figure had risen to 3 million by the first 
decade of the nineteenth century. The potato provided many more calories per 
hectare than wheat or rye (but not necessarily in terms of hours worked), and 
allowed many small farmers to subsist, freeing them to use the rest of  their land 
and labor to grow cash crops. Yet there were limits on an agricultural system 
excessively  dependent  on the  potato,  as  it was  both difficult  to store and 
transport, which made it  difficult  for  growers  to  accumulate savings  as  an 
insurance against crop failure (Mokyr, 1985). 
Technological change could provide a way for the population to grow while 
simultaneously improving labor productivity and living standards. According 
to Boserup (1965), technological change occurs as a direct result of population 
pressure, as  it is  the increasing difficulty in meeting the current standard of 
living that spurs people to innovate. One could argue that the development of 
European agriculture fits  this characterization, especially the increasing pop-
ulation pressure in the northwest and the response of increasing capitalization 
and the introduction of new crops to use land resources more intensively. But 
there are two caveats to this straightforward and attractive line of reasoning. 
First, it is usual to draw a distinction between "technological change" and the 
"choice of technique." The former is  a dynamic concept: new technology is 
created in response to high or rising input prices. The latter is a static concept: 
farmers are already aware of  a range of  possible production techniques and they 
choose the least-cost method of production given the prices that they face. 
Many of the fertilization techniques (such as liming and marling) that carne 
into fashion in the eighteenth century in England and the N etherlands had been known for many years (even in Roman times), and farmers had merely chosen 
to reintroduce them because relative prices had shifted in such a way as to make 
it profitable once again.  The same may also be true of sorne aspects of crop 
rotation, such as  the increasing use of clover in England.  In that sense, the 
changes that we see were simply a change in the choice of  technique rather than 
technological change. 
Second, England had one of the highest land-Iabor ratios in the world and 
should really have been inventing labor-saving technologies if it were respond-
ing to resource constraints in the way that Boserup suggested. But the evidence 
on this is very mixed. For example, attempts to introduce steam threshers in the 
1820s sparked the Swing Riots, and the machines vanished in southern Britain 
until the 1850s (Hobsbawn and Rudé, 1968). AIso, it seems likely that innova-
tion in English plow technology was driven by local knowledge spillovers rather 
than local  resource shortages  (as  signalled in the market place by the local 
relative  prices  of labor  and  capital)  (Brunt,  2003).  However,  England  did 
manage to introduce sorne labor-saving machinery at a relatively early date. 
Notably,  by  1871  an  estimated 25  percent of wheat  in England and Wales 
was  harvested by  mechanical  reapers,  considerably more than in Germany 
(3.6  percent in 1882)  or France (6.9 percent in 1882)  (Collins,  1969).  Sorne 
Mediterranean farmers also tested the new labor-saving equipment but rejected 
it  in  preference  for  the  cheaper,  traditional  methods  (Simpson,  1995; 
Federico, 2003). 
It may be that a deeper understanding of technological change requires a 
more holistic view of  agricultural production. Labor productivity in agriculture 
was greatly influenced by the ratio of draft animal  s to human labor. O'Brien 
and  Keyder  (1978,  pp.  115-19)  have  suggested  that  English  farmers  had 
perhaps  two-thirds  more animal  power than their  French  counterparts  in 
1800,  helping to explain the differences  in labor productivity?  The role  of 
horsepower was crucial to increasing output both on and off the farm, and this 
was one of the areas where the Mediterranean region, for example, appears to 
have been at a major disadvantage compared with northern Europe. While the 
technological barrier to increasing the number of farm  animals in northern 
Europe was the lack of winter fodder, a problem overcome with the planting of 
crops  such  as  turnips,  in  southern  Europe  the  seasonal  shortages  of feed 
occurred during the surnmer months. South of Poitou in France the possibil-
ities of growing spring cereal s were limited, cereal yields were perhaps only as 
much as  a third of those in the north, and the long dry summers produced 
poor-quality  grass.  Irrigation  was  an  expensive  solution,  and  this  energy 
2  Wrigley (1991, p. 329) calculates that French farm workers had aboul 2.1 "man·hours" ofhorse labor lO assisl him for each 
hour worked, compared wilh a figure of 3.5 hours for Ihe English workers. Dennison and James SilTm!:.m 
restriction remained in the Mediterranean region until the massive introduc-
tion of tractors in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Adam Smith (1966, Book 3, Chapter IV) wrote that "through the greater part of 
Europe the commerce and manufactures of cities, instead of being the effect, 
have been the cause and occasion of the improvement and cultivation of the 
country." The concentration in cities  of consumers with high incomes  gave 
farmers a major incentive to specialize in commodities whose income elasticities 
of demand were higher than that of cereals. Economic historians such as Jack 
Fisher or Tony Wrigley in particular emphasized the role played by London. 
Outside England and the Netherlands (with its urbanization rate of  30 percent) 
the pull of  the urban market was much weaker for most farmers. In 1850, on the 
eve  of the railway age,  levels  of urbanization were  15  percent in France,  11 
percent in Germany, 17 percent in Spain, 20 percent in Italy, and just 8 percent 
in Austria-Bohemia and 9 percent in Poland (de Vries, 1984, table 3.8). 
A high degree of urbanization might encourage farmers to specialize, but it 
was the efficiency with which food could be brought from the countryside to the 
city which would playa major factor in determining the size of the city in the 
first place. Therefore if Smith could write in the 1770s that the prices of bread 
and butchers' meat were generally the same, or very roughly the same, through-
out the greater part of Britain, this was hardly the case in sorne parts of  Europe 
even a century later. 
Two types of obstacle to domestic trade can be identified. First, there was the 
physical cost of transportation. Second, there were institutional impediments 
such as taxes or the need for official transport permits, or  the outright prohibition 
of  the movements of  goods and (in the case of  eastern Europe) people. These two 
features  were  not entirely separate.  In England communications were  good 
because of the abundance of settlements located close to navigable water, the 
relatively small distances, and the good flow of market information. The risk of 
famine was also low. On the one hand, government policy encouraged farmers to 
continue  planting  even  at times  of abundan  ce,  since  there  were  effectively 
guaranteed minimum prices to farmers because bounties were paid on exports 
in times of low domestic prices. On the other hand, in times of unexpectedly 
small harvests (due, for example, to several consecutive seasons ofbad weather), 
the workers' relatively high incomes attracted imports to make up the shortfall. 
The English case can be contrasted with the situation in much of continental 
Europe.  Grain marketing there was  very heavily controlled,  especially in the 
eighteenth  century,  with  only certain  places  being  permitted to  hold  grain markets and farmers being obliged to market any surplus grain through those 
markets; selling outside the market was  illegal and subject to very harsh legal 
sanctions (Persson, 1999). Transport was costly and information on the size of 
harvests  and stocks  was  limited  or non-existent  for  consumers.  Rumors  of 
shortages could set off panic buying in towns and this encouraged merchants 
to move grain from the countryside, where consumers had limited savings, for 
resale in urban markets. Yet anden régime governments used a whole battery of 
measures to protect further urban consumers: maximum prices, restrictions on 
grain movements, government granaries, and so on. The urban policy bias could 
discourage  grain  planting,  especially  after  poor harvests  when price  ceilings 
effectively  expropriated the profits of farmers.  Farmers might try to increase 
their profits by switching to other crops such as the vine, but often found that 
they were prohibited from doing so. Another obstacle for much of continental 
Europe was that goods transported and introduced into urban areas were taxed, 
a feature that continued well into the twentieth century in sorne countries. 
Famine was a significant problem in early modern Europe, as can be seen by 
the "massive famines of the 1690s in France, Sweden and Finland, 1708-09 in 
France, and 1740-41 in Ireland" (Ó Gráda, 2007, p.  31). The Irish famine of 
1846-52 led to an excess mortality of perhaps a million people. But by 1870, 
serious famine was history in most of western Europe, with a few exceptional 
cases  such as  the Netherlands or Greece in  1944-45. By  contrast, wars and 
Stalinism led to at least three major famines in the east during the first half of 
the twentieth century. Research on developing economies shows that famines 
are not necessarily caused by an overalllack of  food in an economy; instead they 
are caused by  a maldistribution  of food,  either beca use  sorne  social classes 
cannot afford the food they need or beca  use the food cannot be transported to 
the place where it is  most needed (Sen,  1981). The same was  largely true of 
Europe in the period from  1700 to  1870: the structure of local food markets 
profoundly affected how well the agricultural sector met the demands placed 
upon it by the wider economy. 
Despite the physical and legal constraints they faced, grain merchants did 
their best to trade with one another when price differences were sufficient to 
overcome the institutional and transport costs. But how big were these inter-
city prices  differences  and how did they change over time in response to 
increasing political stability and improved communication networks? These 
price differences  provide one metric of the degree  of market integration. 
A second metric is  that of the speed of adjustment. How long does it take 
merchants in London to respond to a price spike in Paris by arbitraging the 
two market prices back down to the level of  the transport cost between the two 
cities? Consumers and producers will both be better off,  on average, if the 
speed of adjustment is faster. Dennison and James  SilTm!:/1n 
Jacks (2005) examined grain price series for 100 cities in Europe and North 
America between  1800  and  1913.  He found  that markets in northwestern 
Europe - such as England and Belgium - were generally already well integrated 
by 1800, both within countries and between them. Price differences were low 
and adjustment speeds were high. Moving further south and east in Europe was 
associated with generally lower levels of market integration on both measures, 
with Austria-Hungary and Spain performing particularly badly. Jacks  found 
considerable evidence of falling price differentials up to 1870 for all countries, 
but no improvement in adjustment speeds. Regression analysis of both price 
differentials and adjustment speeds revealed the type of  economic behavior that 
we would expect to find: better transport links (canals, railways, ports, and river 
connections)  resulted  in  smaller  price  differentials  and higher  adjustment 
speeds. However, it is interesting to note that Jacks (2006) shows that improve-
ments  in  market integration over time were  not due  to improvements in 
transport  networks;  instead,  they were  due to  improved political  stability. 
Whilst Jacks's  results are certainly interesting, Coleman  (1999)  argues that 
tests of market integration based on prices alone may be misleading, because 
it is  difficult  to distinguish  between increased synchronicity of shocks and 
increased speed of  adjustment. Brunt and Cannon (2007) address this problem 
by breaking down price differentials into four components: the average price 
differential, the variance of  the price shocks, the correlation between the shocks 
and the two price series, and the speed of  adjustment of one series to the other. 
They find that for England between 1770 and 1820 virtually all the deviation 
from the "law of  one price" was due to the average price differential, rather than 
the adjustment speed; like Jacks, they find that the marked improvement in 
roads and canals over the period had very Httle effect. 
For sorne regions, export markets were of particular importance. By the late 
eighteenth century the major trade flows in basic foodstuffs, such as grain, were 
from the Baltic (especially East Prussia and Poland) towards northwest Europe 
(especially the Netherlands, which was both a consuming center and a distri-
bution hub). From the early nineteenth century onwards, England became the 
major European importer and began to draw grain additionally from Russia 
through the Black Sea.  The total quantities shipped were nonetheless quite 
small compared with overall consumption; even in England in the 1850s, after 
the move to free trade, wheat imports amounted to only around 25 percent of 
total consumption. There was very Httle impact from trade with the New World 
before 1870 (O'Rourke, 1997; O'Rourke and Williamson, 1999). 
Wine had been an important cornmodity in international trade in earlier periods, 
but between the mid-seventeenth and the late eighteenth centuries the production 
of specialized  fine  wines  underwent  major  transformations  that  changed  the 
patterns  of trade  and  consumption.  Port  was  a  drink  developed  by  British Agriculture 
merchants in Portugal for consumption in Britain. The development of fine wines 
in the Bordeaux region can be dated to the period between about 1650 and 1740, 
involving the draining of the Médoc and the introduction of cylindrical bottles 
and corks  that allowed  the  best wines  to  be  matured in bottles.  Producers in 
Champagne learnt to  overcome the difficulties  of a second fermentation in the 
bottle  and began  to  market  their  wine  as  a  luxury  product worldwide  (Guy, 
2003). The poor keeping-quality of most wines, high transaction costs, and high 
levels  of taxation  everywhere  limited  the  possibility  for  European  farmers  to 
utilize  labor  more  intensively  and  obtain  productivity  gains  through  market 
specialization  in wine.  Nevertheless,  wines  were  very  important  export  items, 
accounting for about half of all  Portugal's exports in 1850, a quarter of Spain's, 
and a tenth of France'  s. 
Institutions  ----------_._--------
The empirical findings described in the previous sections indicate significant 
variation in labor productivity, technological progress, and market integration 
across Europe in this periodo  Still, a broad patlern can be discerned: southern 
and  eastern  Europe  lagged  behind  the  northwestern  regions  - especially 
England and the Netherlands - in all these areas until well into the nineteenth 
century. How can we account for these differences? While clima  te, geography, 
and differences between cultures may well have had sorne effect on outcomes, 
the role of institutions - in particular the procedures established to  uphold 
property rights and enforce contracts - must not be overlooked. 
An institutional approach  seeks  to  explain differences  in productivity as 
resulting from differences  in the economic, social,  or legal frameworks  that 
characterize a particular society. For instance, without secure property rights 
farmers  - regardless  of cultural beliefs  or length of growing season - were 
unlikely to invest in agricultural innovations, since they could not be sure that 
the  returns  to  such  investments would accrue  to  them.  Without a  reliable 
system of contract enforcement, peasant farmers could not obtain credit, and 
thus could not undertake expensive innovations. Property rights and contract 
enforcement varied substantially across Europe (and within any given country) 
in this  periodo  How these  processes worked in any given  place was  largely 
determined by the local institutional framework - in particular, by the strength 
of local corporate entities, such as landlords, churches, and communities. 
In England these groups were relatively weak. Instead, there was a remark-
ably centralized legal framework and system of courts, which developed at a 
very early date. Even in the medieval period, when the Church and landlords 
were quite powerful and had much control over their peasant tenants (serfs), an Tracy Dennison and James 
integrated  system  of courts  was  used,  even  by serfs,  for  the  resolution  of 
property and credit disputes? Not only were  there manorial courts, where 
disputes regarding transactions among serfs were heard, there were also royal 
courts, to which cases could even be brought against landlords who violated 
customary agreements by raising rents or demanding additional labor. This 
legal framework was not nearly as sophisticated as that which exists today, but 
it nonetheless sufficiently reduced the risk involved in transactions to enable 
the existence of lively rural markets in land and credit, as well as  grain and 
livestock. (English agricultural productivity was aided by later developments, 
such as the enclosure of  open fields, which resulted in even more clearly defined 
property rights.) 
In much of  southern Europe, rights to property were less clearly defined, and 
improvements in agriculture were hindered by disputes between powerfullocal 
groups over control of  resources. Due to uncertainty in property rights in parts 
of  Ancien Régime France, landlords and villagers could ofien claim rights to the 
same lands (Rosenthal, 1992; Hoffman, 1996). While France did have a system 
of courts to decide such questions, this system did not function particularly 
well. The litigation process was slow and costly, and decisions that were granted 
could be appealed repeatedly. This did little to reduce uncertainty, and inno-
vation remained a risky undertaking. The situation only improved, with greater 
investment  in  technological  innovation,  when  a  uniform  system  of clearly 
assigned property rights was introduced by the Revolution. 
Agriculture in Spain,  too, was  affected by uncertainty in property rights. 
"Ownership" in Spain ofien had severallayers, with those who had rights to the 
rents from land being distinguished from those who had the right to cultivate it 
(dominium directum and dominium utile) (Simpson, 1995). Agricultural inno-
vations  were  further  hindered by powerful  local  groups,  who  held  special 
privileges  from the crown.  One such institution was  the Mesta,  a powerful 
association of  shepherds and sheep owners on which the crown, in exchange for 
payment, had bestowed rights to pasture on all  traditionally unsown land. 
While there has been sorne debate in recent years over the broader economic 
effects of  Mesta privileges (Nugent and Sanchez, 1989), many historians main-
tain (as  did contemporary observers) that the powers of the Mesta made it 
difficult to endose property and delayed bringing pasture under cultivation, 
and thus limited the possibilities for improving agricultural production. 
Landlords' powers had similarly negative effects on agricultural productivity. 
In sorne parts ofItaly (such as Tuscany) landlords were able to control the way 
3  Even in a place as centra!ized as England there was institutiona! variation. Recent research on rura! debt litigation in the 
thirteenlh and fourteenth  centuries suggests lhat manoria! court procedures - and lhe way courts were  perceived to 
function by local inhabitants - had a significant effect on lhe size and shape of local credit markets. See Briggs (2006). ~) g:;:!;1  Agriculture 
in which tenants' lands were allocated and used.  Many retained the right to 
terminate leases  at will.  Insecurity of tenure and the regular confiscation of 
surpluses made it unlikely that tenant farmers in these regions would invest in 
improving yields. In central and eastern Europe, landlords had even greater 
powers. Much ofEurope east of  the river Elbe was in this period still under the 
«second serfdom,,,4 a tenurial system in which landlords had significant control 
over the allocation of  their tenants' labor. Serfs are often said to have been «tied 
to the land" because, in most serf societies, they were not free to leave their 
landlords' holdings. They cultivated land which they rented from their lords 
and for which they usually paid an annual fee in cash or kind. In addition, many 
serfs were obliged to spend several days a week cultivating their landlord'  s own 
land (demesne). Serfs were thus unable to allocate their full supply oflabor to 
their own plots, and any attempt to increase productivity was undermined. And 
they had no incentive to  use  their labor efficiently on the demesne,  as  the 
benefits of their exertion accrued mainly to the landlord. 
Landlords  under  the  second  serfdom  engaged  in  various  forms  of rent 
seeking.  Sorne  held monopolies  on brewing and insisted their tenants buy 
local beer at inflated prices.  Sorne  held monopolies on milling and insisted 
their tenants bring grain to the manorial millo  Most landlords extracted fees 
from  their tenants  for  permission  to  marry or to travel  beyond the  estate 
boundaries.
5  It might be  argued  that serfs  were  often  able  to  evade  estate 
policies,  thus  minimizing  their  effects  on  productivity.  However,  getting 
round rules and regulations was also costly. Serfs  often had to pay bribes to 
estate officials and risked fines for violating estate rules. The end result was a 
steady confiscation of  surpluses which made it very difficult for peasant farmers 
to accumulate the wealth necessary to invest in improving their yields. Such 
rent seeking simultaneously provided a disincentive for such investments, since 
the returns were anyway likely to be siphoned off by landlords. 
Incentives for  innovation were  further undermined by strong local  com-
munities. In much of central Europe, communities controlled access to land 
through their power to regulate transfers. For instance, in the Württemberg 
Black Forest, peasant farmers could not sell or bequeath holdings without the 
permission of the community. Village communities in this region regulated 
access to common resources, and were responsible for deciding how arable land 
would be used. Those who wished to plant new crops or adopt new technologies 
had to have the permission of village officials.
6 Strong local communities also 
existed under the second serfdom. Like the communities in Württemberg, they, 
4  "Second" because it carne after medieval serfdom or "feudalism,"  though  il is worth nOling lhal  nol all  places which 
experienced a "second" serfdom had experienced a "tirst." 
s  Examples of such practices can be found in Ogilvie (2001 ); Hagen (2002), Dennison (2006); Dennison and Ogilvie (2007). 
6  See discussion in Ogilvie (1997), esp. ch. 3; Warde (2006). Conclusion 
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together with landlords, had the power to regulate transfers and take decisions 
about the use of commons and arable. In many places, serf communities had 
the power to take land away from households they viewed as not economically 
viable. On esta  tes in Bohemia and in Prussia, for instance, widows could be 
forced by the community to remarry in order to retain their holdings (Ogilvie 
and Edwards, 2000; Hagen, 2002). In Russian serf society, where most arable 
was held in communal tenure, communal officials allocated land in accordance 
with  the  number  of laborers  and  consumers  in  each  household.  When a 
household changed in composition, these officials had the power to reallocate 
sorne portion of its land to another, larger household. 
Restrictions  on mobility,  enforced  by both landlords  and communities, 
affected the pace of  urbanization and market integration in central and eastern 
Europe. In serf societies, those who paid rents in cash or kind could ofien get 
permission to engage in migrant labor in nearby towns or cities, though they 
were not gene rally permitted to migrate permanentIy. They were still required 
to fulfill certain annual obligations on the estate - or at least hire someone to 
fulfill  them in their absence. Serfs who owed regular labor on the landlord's 
demesne  were  less  likely  to  obtain  permission  to  leave,  even  temporarily. 
Communities in serf societies, as well as in areas without serfdom, ofien had 
a say in whether their members were allowed to travel, as well as in whether new 
householders could settle in the village.  Many landlords required that a serf 
obtain the permission of the community before he or she would agree to issue 
travel documents. N ot surprisingly, then, this regíon urbanized much more 
slowly. Even at the begínning of  the nineteenth century, there were no cities as 
big as London or Paris in central or eastern Europe. 
It is no coinciden  ce that those places where agricultural productivity improved 
first were also the first to industrialize. For industrialization to occur, it had to 
be possible to produce more food with fewer people. England was able to do this 
because  markets tended to be  more efficient,  and incentives for  farmers  to 
in  crease output were strong. As labor flowed to the cities, agricultural output 
and imports of  food and raw materials increased. By 1840, labor productivity in 
agriculture was as high as that ofthe rest ofthe economy (Crafis, 1985a). 
Why did other countries, especially those in eastern and southern Europe, 
take longer to in  crease farm output and productivity? Natural resource endow-
ments were clearly different from those of northwest Europe, which perhaps 
made it harder to develop and introduce new farming techniques and com-
mercial crops. However, a greater obstacle would appear to have been the fact that there were fewer  incentives for  farmers to change production systems, 
either because they faced major difficulties in reaching potential consumers, or 
because  institutional arrangements  failed  to overcome  problems of market 
failure. 
When new techniques, crop rotations, or the reorganization ofland owner-
ship were rejected, it was not necessarily because economic agents were averse 
to change, but because the traditional systems were considered more profitable 
by those with vested interests. Agricultural productivity in southern and east-
ern Europe may have been low, but the large landowners were often exceed-
ingly  rich,  and were  successful  in maintaining policies  which  favored  the 
current production systems.  In Britain, the abolition of the Corn Laws  and 
the collapse in domestic cereal prices, especially after 1873, not only seriously 
challenged the economic and political base  of the country's aristocracy and 
landowning classes, but also increased urban real wages, thereby providing new 
opportunities  for  other forms  of farming,  such  as  labor-intensive  market 
gardening. Outside northwest Europe, changes did take place between  1700 
and 1870, but tended to be more localized. Only in the twentieth century did 
parts of  southern and eastern Europe begin to achieve productivity levels found 
in the northwest in the late nineteenth century. 